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Abstract
Strategy Logic (SL) is a very expressive logic for specifying and verifying properties of multi-agent
systems: in SL, one can quantify over strategies, assign them to agents, and express properties
of the resulting plays. Such a powerful framework has two drawbacks: first, model checking
SL has non-elementary complexity; second, the exact semantics of SL is rather intricate, and
may not correspond to what is expected. In this paper, we focus on strategy dependences in SL,
by tracking how existentially-quantified strategies in a formula may (or may not) depend on
other strategies selected in the formula. We study different kinds of dependences, refining the
approach of [Mogavero et al., Reasoning about strategies: On the model-checking problem, 2014],
and prove that they give rise to different satisfaction relations. In the setting where strategies
may only depend on what they have observed, we identify a large fragment of SL for which we
prove model checking can be performed in 2 -EXPTIME.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.3.1 Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Pro-
grams, F.4.1 Mathematical Logic
Keywords and phrases Game theory, strategy logic, dependence
1 Introduction
Temporal logics. Since Pnueli’s seminal paper [19] in 1977, temporal logics have been
widely used in theoretical computer science, especially by the formal-verification community.
Temporal logics provide powerful languages for expressing properties of reactive systems,
and enjoy efficient algorithms for satisfiability and model checking [8]. Since the early 2000s,
new temporal logics have appeared to address open and multi-agent systems. While classical
temporal logics (e.g. CTL [7, 20] and LTL [19]) could only deal with one or all the behaviours
of the whole system, ATL [2] expresses properties of (executions generated by) behaviours
of individual components of the system. ATL has been extensively studied since then, both
about its expressiveness and about its verification algorithms [2, 10, 12].
Strategic interactions in ATL. Strategies in ATL are handled in a very limited way, and
there are no real strategic interactions in that logic (which, in return, enjoys a polynomial-time
model-checking algorithm). Over the last 10 years, various extensions have been defined
and studied in order to allow for more interactions [1, 6, 5, 14, 21]. Strategy Logic (SL for
short) [6, 14] is such a powerful approach, in which strategies are first-class objects; formulas
can quantify (universally and existentially) over strategies, store those strategies in variables,
assign them to players, and express properties of the resulting plays. As a simple example,
the existence of a winning strategy for Player A (with objective ϕA) against any strategy of
Player B would be written as ∃σA. ∀σB . assign(A 7→ σA;B 7→ σB). ϕA. This makes the logic
both expressive and easy to use (at first sight), at the expense of a very high complexity:
SL model checking has non-elementary complexity, and satisfiability is undecidable [14, 11].
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Strategy dependences in SL. It has been noticed in recent works that the nice express-
iveness of SL comes with unexpected phenomena. One recently-identified phenomenon [4]
is induced by the separation of strategy quantification and strategy assignment: are the
events between strategy quantifications and strategy assignments part of the memory of the
strategy? While both options may make sense depending on the applications, only one of
them makes model checking decidable [4].
A second phenomenon—which is the main focus of the present paper—concerns strategy
dependences [14]: in a formula such as ∀σA. ∃σB . ξ, the existentially-quantified strategy σB
may depend on the whole strategy σA; in other terms, the action returned by strategy σB after
some finite history ρ may depend on what strategy σA would play on any other history ρ′.
Again, this may be desirable in some contexts, but it may also make sense to require that
strategy σB after history ρ can be computed based solely on what has been observed along ρ.
This approach was initiated in [14, 16], conjecturing that large fragments of SL (subsum-
ing ATL∗) would have 2 -EXPTIME model-checking algorithms with such limited dependences.
Our contributions. We follow this line of work by performing a more thorough exploration
of strategy dependences in (a fragment of) SL. We mainly follow the framework of [16], based
on a kind of Skolemization of the formula: for instance, a formula of the form (∀xi∃yi)i. ξ is
satisfied if there exists a dependence map θ defining each existentially-quantified strategy yj
based on the universally-quantified strategies (xi)i. In order to recover the classical semantics
of SL, it is only required that the strategy θ((xi)i)(yj) (i.e. the strategy assigned to the
existentially-quantified variable yj by θ((xi)i)) only depends on (xi)i<j .
Based on this definition, other constraints can be imposed on dependence maps, in order
to refine the dependences of existentially-quantified strategies on universally-quantified ones.
Elementary dependences [16] only allows existentially-quantified strategy yj to depend on
the values of (xi)i<j along the current history. This gives rise to two different semantics in
general, but fragments of SL have been defined on which the classic and elementary semantics
would coincide [13, 15].
We introduce yet another kind of dependences, which we coin timeline dependences,
and which extends elementary dependences by allowing existentially-quantified strategies
to additionally depend on all universally-quantified strategies along strict prefixes of the
current history. This we believe is even more relevant than elementary dependences.
We study and compare those three dependences (classic, elementary and timeline),
showing that they correspond to three distinct semantics. Because the semantics based
on dependence maps is defined in terms of the existence of a witness map, we show that
the syntactic negation of a formula may not correspond to its semantic negation: there
are cases where both a formula ϕ and its syntactic negation ¬ϕ fail to hold (i.e., none of
them has a witness map). This phenomenon is already present, but had not been formally
identified, in [14, 16]. The main contribution of the present paper is the definition of a
fragment of SL for which syntactic and semantic negations coincide for the timeline semantics.
As an (important) side result, we show that model checking this fragment under the timeline
semantics is 2 -EXPTIME-complete.
2 Definitions
2.1 Concurrent game structures
For the rest of this paper, we fix a finite set AP of atomic propositions, a finite set V of
variables, and a finite set Agt of agents (or players).
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A concurrent game structure is a tuple G = (Act,Q,∆, lab) where Act is a finite set
of actions, Q is a finite set of states, ∆: Q × ActAgt → Q is the transition function, and
lab : Q → 2AP is a labelling function. An element of ActAgt will be called a move vector.
For any q ∈ Q, we let succ(q) be the set {q′ ∈ Q | ∃m ∈ ActAgt. q′ = ∆(q,m)}. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume in the sequel that succ(q) 6= ∅ for any q ∈ Q. A game G is said
turn-based whenever for every state q ∈ Q, there is a player own(q) ∈ Agt (named the owner
of q) such that for any two move vectors m1 and m2 with m1(own(q)) = m2(own(q)), it holds
∆(q,m1) = ∆(q,m2). Figure 1 displays an example of a (turn-based) game.
Fix a state q ∈ Q. A play in G from q is an infinite sequence pi = (qi)i∈N of states in Q
such that q0 = q and qi ∈ succ(qi−1) for all i > 0. We write PlayG(q) for the set of plays in G
from q. In this and all similar notations, we might omit to mention G when it is clear from
the context, and q when we consider the union over all q ∈ Q. A (strict) prefix of a play pi is a
finite sequence ρ = (qi)0≤i≤L, for some L ∈ N. We write Pref(pi) for the set of strict prefixes
of play pi. Such finite prefixes are called histories, and we let HistG(q) = Pref(PlayG(q)).
We extend the notion of strict prefixes and the notation Pref to histories in the natural way,
requiring in particular that ρ /∈ Pref(ρ). A (finite) extension of a history ρ is any history ρ′
such that ρ ∈ Pref(ρ′). Let ρ = (qi)i≤L be a history. We define first(ρ) = q0 and last(ρ) = qL.
Let ρ′ = (q′j)j≤L′ be a history from last(ρ). The concatenation of ρ and ρ′ is then defined
as the path ρ · ρ′ = (q′′k )k≤L+L′ such that q′′k = qk when k ≤ L and q′′k = q′k−L when L ≥ k
(notice that we required q′0 = qL).
A strategy from q is a mapping δ : HistG(q) → Act. We write StratG(q) for the set of
strategies in G from q. Given a strategy δ ∈ Strat(q) and a history ρ from q, the translation δ−→ρ
of δ by ρ is the strategy δ−→ρ from last(ρ) defined by δ−→ρ (ρ′) = δ(ρ ·ρ′) for any ρ′ ∈ Hist(last(ρ)).
A valuation from q is a partial function χ : V ∪ Agt ⇀ Strat(q). As usual, for any partial
function f , we write dom(f) for the domain of f .
Let q ∈ Q and χ be a valuation from q. If Agt ⊆ dom(χ), then χ induces a unique
play from q, called its outcome, and defined as out(q, χ) = (qi)i∈N such that q0 = q and for
every i ∈ N, we have qi+1 = ∆(qi,mi) with mi(A) = χ(A)((qj)j≤i) for every A ∈ Agt.
2.2 Strategy Logic with boolean goals
Strategy Logic (SL for short) was introduced in [6], and further extended and studied
in [17, 14], as a rich logical formalism for expressing properties of games. SL manipulates
strategies as first-order elements, assigns them to players, and expresses LTL properties
on the outcomes of the resulting strategic interactions. This results in a very expressive
temporal logic, for which satisfiability is undecidable [17] and model checking is TOWER-
complete [14, 3]. In this paper, we focus on a restricted fragment of SL, called SL[BG][ (where
BG stands for boolean goals [14], and the symbol [ indicates that we do not allow nesting of
(closed) subformulas; we discuss this latter restriction below).
Syntax. Formulas in SL[BG][ are built along the following grammar
SL[BG][ 3 ϕ ::= ∃x. ϕ | ∀x. ϕ | ξ ξ ::= ¬ξ | ξ ∧ ξ | ξ ∨ ξ | β
β ::= assign(σ). ψ ψ ::= ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | Xψ | ψUψ | p
where x ranges over V , σ ranges over the set VAgt of full assignments, and p ranges over AP.
A goal is a formula of the form β in the grammar above; it expresses an LTL property ψ on the
outcome of the mapping σ. Formulas in SL[BG][ are thus made of an initial block of first-order
quantifiers (selecting strategies for variables in V), followed by a boolean combination of
such goals.
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Free variables. With any subformula ζ of some formula ϕ ∈ SL[BG][, we associate its set
of free agents and variables, which we write free(ζ). It contains the agents and variables that
have to be associated with a strategy in order to unequivocally evaluate ζ (as will be seen
from the definition of the semantics of SL[BG][ below). The set free(ζ) is defined inductively:
free(p) = ∅ for all p ∈ AP free(Xψ) = Agt ∪ free(ψ)
free(¬α) = free(α) free(ψ1Uψ2) = Agt ∪ free(ψ1) ∪ free(ψ2)
free(α1 ∨ α2) = free(α1) ∪ free(α2) free(∃x. ϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {x}
free(α1 ∧ α2) = free(α1) ∪ free(α2) free(∀x. ϕ) = free(ϕ) \ {x}
free(assign(σ). ϕ) = (free(ϕ) ∪ σ(Agt ∩ free(ϕ))) \ Agt
Subformula ζ is said to be closed whenever free(ζ) = ∅. We can now comment on our choice
of considering the flat fragment of SL[BG]: the full fragment, as defined in [14], allows for
nesting closed SL[BG] formulas in place of atomic propositions. The meaning of such nesting
in our setting is ambiguous, because our semantics (in Sections 3 to 5) are defined in terms of
the existence of a witness, which does not easily propagate in formulas. In particular, as we
explain later in the paper, the semantics of the negation of a formula (there exist a witness
for ¬ϕ) does not coincide with the negation of the semantics (there is no witness for ϕ); thus
substituting a subformula and substituting its negation may return different results.
Semantics. Fix a state q ∈ Q, and a valuation χ : V∪Agt→ Strat(q). We inductively define
the semantics of a subformula α of a formula of SL[BG][ at q under valuation χ, requiring
free(α) ⊆ dom(χ). We omit the easy cases of boolean combinations and atomic propositions.
Given a mapping σ : Agt→ V , the semantics of strategy assignments is defined as follows:
G, q |=χ assign(σ). ψ ⇔ G, q |=χ[A∈Agt7→χ(σ(A))] ψ.
Notice that, writing χ′ = χ[A ∈ Agt 7→ χ(σ(A))], we have free(ψ) ⊆ dom(χ′) if free(α) ⊆
dom(χ), so that our inductive definition is sound.
We now consider path formulas ψ = Xψ1 and ψ = ψ1Uψ2. Since Agt ⊆ free(ψ) ⊆
dom(χ), the valuation χ induces a unique outcome out(q, χ) = (qi)i∈N from q. For n ∈ N,
we write outn(q, χ) = (qi)i≤n, and define χ−→n as the valuation obtained by shifting all
the strategies in the image of χ by outn(q, χ). Under the same conditions, we also define
q−→n = last(outn(q, χ)). We then set
G, q |=χ Xψ1 ⇔ G, q−→1 |=χ−→1 ψ1
G, q |=χ ψ1Uψ2 ⇔ ∃k ∈ N. G, q−→k |=χ−→k ψ2 and ∀0 ≤ j < k. G, q−→j |=χ−→j ψ1.
It remains to define the semantics of the strategy quantifiers. This is actually what this
paper is all about. We provide here the original semantics, and discuss alternatives in the
following sections:
G, q |=χ ∃x.ϕ ⇔ ∃δ ∈ Strat(q). G, q |=χ[x 7→δ] ϕ.
In the sequel, we use classical shorthands, such as > for p ∨ ¬p (for any p ∈ AP), Fψ for
>Uψ (eventually ψ), and Gψ for ¬F¬ψ (always ψ).
I Example 1. We consider the (turn-based) game G is depicted on Fig. 1. We name the
players after the shape of the state they control. The SL[BG] formula ϕ to the right of Fig. 1
has four quantified variables and two goals. We show that this formula evaluates to true
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q0
q1
q2
p1
p2
ϕ = ∀y.∃z.∀xA.∀xB .
∨{assign( 7→ xA; 7→ y; 7→ z). F p1
assign( 7→ xB ; 7→ y; 7→ z). F p2
Figure 1 A game and a SL[BG] formula.
at q0: fix a strategy δy (to be played by player ); because G is turn-based, we identify the
actions of the owner of a state with the resulting target state, so that δy(q0q1) will be either p1
or p2. We then define strategy δz (to be played by ) as δz(q0q2) = δy(q0q1). Then clearly,
for any strategy assigned to player , one of the goals of formula ϕ holds true, so that ϕ
itself evaluates to true.
Subclasses of SL[BG]. Because of the high complexity and subtlety of reasoning with SL
and SL[BG], several restrictions of SL[BG] have been considered in the literature [13, 15, 16],
by adding further restrictions to boolean combinations in the grammar defining the syntax:
SL[1G] restricts SL[BG] to a unique goal. SL[1G][ is then defined from the grammar of
SL[BG][ by setting ξ ::= β in the grammar;
the larger fragment SL[CG] allows for conjunctions of goals. SL[CG][ corresponds to
formulas defined with ξ ::= ξ ∧ ξ | β;
similarly, SL[DG] only allows disjunctions of goals, i.e. ξ ::= ξ ∨ ξ | β;
finally, SL[AG] mixes conjunctions and disjunctions in a restricted way. Goals in SL[AG][
can be combined using the following grammar: ξ ::= β ∧ ξ | β ∨ ξ | β.
In the sequel, we write a generic SL[BG][ formula ϕ as (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ξ(βj . ψj)j≤n where:
(Qixi)i≤l is a block of quantifications, with {xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ l} ⊆ V and Qi ∈ {∃,∀}, for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ l;
ξ(g1, ..., gn) is a boolean combination of its arguments;
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, βj . ψj is a goal: βj is a full assignment and ψj is an LTL formula.
3 Strategy dependences
We now follow the framework of [14, 16] and define the semantics of SL[BG][ in terms of
dependence maps. This approach provides a fine way of controlling how existentially-quantified
strategies depend on previously selected strategies (in a quantifier block). Considering
again Example 1, we notice that the value of the existentially-quantified strategy δz after
history q0q2 depends on the value of strategy δy on history q0q1, which may not be realistic.
Using dependence maps, we can limit such dependences.
Dependence maps. Consider an SL[BG][ formula ϕ = (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ξ(βj . ϕj)j≤n, assuming
w.l.o.g. that {xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ l} = V. We let V∀ = {xi | Qi = ∀} ⊆ V be the set of
universally-quantified variables of ϕ. A function θ : StratV
∀ → StratV is a ϕ-map (or map
when ϕ is clear from the context) if θ(w)(xi)(ρ) = w(xi)(ρ) for any w ∈ StratV
∀
, any xi ∈ V∀,
and any history ρ. In other words, θ(w) extends w to V. This general notion allows any
existentially-quantified variable to depend on all universally-quantified ones (dependence on
existentially-quantified variables is implicit: all existentially-quantified variables are assigned
through a single map, hence they all depend on the others); we add further restrictions
later on. Using maps, we may then define new semantics for SL[BG][: generally speaking,
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formula ϕ = (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ξ(βj . ϕj)j≤n holds true if there exists a ϕ-map θ such that, for any
w : V∀ → Strat, the valuation θ(w) makes ξ(βj . ϕj)j≤n hold true.
Classic maps are dependence maps in which the order of quantification is respected:
∀w1, w2 ∈ StratV
∀
. ∀xi ∈ V \ V∀.(∀xj ∈ V∀ ∩ {xj | j < i}. w1(xj) = w2(xj))⇒ (θ(w1)(xi) = θ(w2)(xi)). (C)
In words, if w1 and w2 coincide on V∀ ∩ {xj | j < i}, then θ(w1) and θ(w2) coincide on xi.
Elementary maps [14, 13] have to satisfy a more restrictive condition: for those maps,
the value of an existentially-quantified strategy at any history ρ may only depend on the
value of earlier universally-quantified strategies along ρ. This may be written as:
∀w1, w2 ∈ StratV
∀
. ∀xi ∈ V \ V∀. ∀ρ ∈ Hist.(∀xj ∈ V∀ ∩ {xk | k < i}. ∀ρ′ ∈ Pref(ρ) ∪ {ρ}. w1(xj)(ρ′) = w2(xj)(ρ′))⇒(
θ(w1)(xi)(ρ) = θ(w2)(xi)(ρ)
)
. (E)
In this case, for any history ρ, if two valuations w1 and w2 of the universally-quantified
variables coincide on the variables quantified before xi all along ρ, then θ(w1)(xi) and
θ(w2)(xi) have to coincide at ρ.
The difference between both kinds of dependences is illustrated on Fig. 2: for classic
maps, the existentially-quantified strategy x2 may depend on the whole strategy x1, while it
may only depend on the value of x1 along the current history for elementary maps. Notice
that a map satisfying (E) also satisfies (C).
Satisfaction relations. Pick a formula ϕ = (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ξ
(
βj . ϕj
)
j≤n in SL[BG]
[. We define:
G, q |=C ϕ iff ∃θ satisfying (C). ∀w ∈ StratV∀ . G, q |=θ(w) ξ
(
βjϕj
)
j≤n
As explained above, this actually corresponds to the usual semantics of SL[BG][ as given in
Section 2 [14, Theorem 4.6]. When G, q |=C ϕ, a map θ satisfying the conditions above is
called a C-witness of ϕ for G and q. Similarly, we define the elementary semantics [14] as:
G, q |=E ϕ iff ∃θ satisfying (E). ∀w ∈ StratV∀ . G, q |=θ(w) ξ
(
βjϕj
)
j≤n
Again, when such a map exists, it is called an E-witness. Notice that since Property (E)
implies Property (C), we have G, q |=E ϕ⇒ G, q |=C ϕ for any ϕ ∈ SL[BG][. This corresponds
to the intuition that it is harder to satisfy a SL[BG][ formula when dependences are more
restricted. The contrapositive statement then raises questions about the negation of formulas.
∀x1 ∃x2 ∀x3 ∀x1 ∃x2 ∀x3
Figure 2 Classical (left) vs elementary (right) dependences for a formula ∀x1. ∃x2. ∀x3. ξ
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q0
A
p1 p2
B
p1 p2
ϕ = ∀x.∃y.
∧{assign( 7→ y). FB
assign( 7→ x). F p1 ⇔ assign( 7→ y). F p1
Figure 3 A game G and an SL[BG][ formula ϕ such that G, q0 6|=E ϕ and G, q0 6|=E ¬ϕ.
The syntactic vs. semantic negations. If ϕ = (Qixi)1≤i≤lξ(βjϕj)j≤n is an SL[BG][ formula,
its syntactic negation ¬ϕ is the formula (Qixi)i≤l(¬ξ)(βjϕj)j≤n, where Qi = ∃ if Qi = ∀
and Qi = ∀ if Qi = ∃. Looking at the definitions of |=C and |=E , it could be the case
that e.g. G, q |=C ϕ and G, q |=C ¬ϕ: this only requires the existence of two adequate
maps. However, since |=C and |= coincide, and since G, q |= ϕ ⇔ G, q 6|= ¬ϕ in the usual
semantics, we get G, q |=C ϕ⇔ G, q 6|=C ¬ϕ. Also, since G, q |=E ϕ⇒ G, q |=C ϕ, we also get
G, q |=E ϕ⇒ G, q 6|=E ¬ϕ. As we now show, the converse implication may fail to hold.
I Proposition 1. There exist a (one-player) game G with initial state q0 and a formula
ϕ ∈ SL[BG][ such that G, q0 6|=E ϕ and G, q0 6|=E ¬ϕ.
Proof. Consider the formula and the one-player game of Fig. 3. We start by proving that
G, q0 6|=E ϕ, by looking for a witness for ϕ. First, for the first goal in the conjunction to be
fulfilled, the strategy assigned to y must play to B from q0, whatever the valuation w for
the universal variable x. We abbreviate this as θ(w)(y)(q0) = B in the sequel. Now, for a
valuation w s.t. w(x)(q0) = A, we must have θ(w)(y)(q0 ·B) = w(x)(q0 ·A) in order to fulfill
the second goal. Such dependences are not allowed in the elementary semantics.
We now prove that G, q0 6|=E ¬ϕ. Indeed, following the previous discussion, we easily
get that G, q0 |=C ϕ, by letting θ(w)(y)(q0) = B and θ(w)(y)(q0 · B) = w(x)(q0 · A) if
w(x)(q0) = A, and θ(w)(y)(q0 ·B) = w(x)(q0 ·B) if w(x)(q0) = B. As explained above, this
entails G, q0 6|=C ¬ϕ, and G, q0 6|=E ¬ϕ. J
The case of SL[1G][ is simpler and we get:
I Proposition 2. For any game G with initial state q0, and any formula ϕ ∈ SL[1G][, it holds
G, q0 |=E ϕ⇔ G, q0 6|=E ¬ϕ.
Sketch of proof. This result follows from [14, Corollary 4.21], which states that |=C and |=E
coincide on SL[1G]. Because it is central in our approach, we sketch a direct proof here (with
a full proof in Appendix A.1), using similar ingredients: it consists in encoding the problem
whether G, q0 |=E ϕ into a two-player turn-based game with a parity-winning objective.
The construction is as follows: the interaction between existential and universal quantific-
ations of the formula is integrated into the game structure, replacing each state of G with a
tree-shaped subgame where Player P∃ selects existentially-quantified actions and Player P∀
selects universally-quantified ones. The unique goal of the formula is then incorporated
into the game via a deterministic parity automaton, yielding a two-player turn-based parity
game. We then show that G, q0 |=E ϕ if, and only if, Player P∃ has a winning strategy in
the resulting turn-based parity game, while G, q0 |=E ¬ϕ if, and only if, Player P∀ has a
winning strategy. Those equivalences hold for the elementary semantics because memoryless
strategies are sufficient in parity games. Proposition 2 then follows by determinacy of those
games [9, 18]. J
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∀x1 ∃x2 ∀x3 ∀x1 ∃x2 ∀x3
Figure 4 Elementary (left) vs timeline (right) dependences for a formula ∀x1. ∃x2. ∀x3. ξ
Note that the construction of the parity game gives an effective algorithm for the model-
checking problem of SL[1G][, which runs in time doubly-exponential in the size of the formula,
and polynomial in the size of the game structure; we recover the result of [14] for that problem.
Comparison of |=C and |=E. A consequence of Prop. 2 is that |=C and |=E coincide
on SL[1G][ (Corollary 4.21 of [14]). However, when considering larger fragments, the satisfac-
tion relations are distinct (see the proof of Prop. 1 for a candidate formula in SL[CG][):
I Proposition 3. The relations |=C and |=E differ on SL[CG][, as well as on SL[DG][.
I Remark. Proposition 3 contradicts the claim in [15] that |=E and |=C coincide on SL[CG]
(and SL[DG]). Indeed, in [15], the satisfaction relation for SL[DG] and SL[CG] is encoded into
a two-player game in pretty much the same way as we did in the proof of Prop. 2. While this
indeed rules out dependences outside the current history, it also gives information to Player P∃
about the values (over prefixes of the current history) of strategies that are universally-
quantified later in the quantification block. This proof technique works with SL[1G][ because
the single goal can be encoded as a parity objective, for which memoryless strategies exist,
so that the extra information is not crucial. In the next section, we investigate the role of
this extra information for larger fragments of SL[BG][.
4 Timeline dependences
Following the discussion above, we introduce a new type of dependences between strategies
(which we call timeline dependences). They allow strategies to also observe (and depend on) all
other universally-quantified strategies on the strict prefix of the current history. For instance,
for a block of quantifiers ∀x1. ∃x2. ∀x3, the value of x2 after history ρ may depend on the value
of x1 on ρ and its prefixes (as for elementary maps), but also on the value of x3 on the (strict)
prefixes of ρ. Such dependences are depicted on Fig. 4. We believe that such dependences
are relevant in many situations, especially for reactive synthesis, since in this framework
strategies really base their decisions on what they could observe along the current history.
Formally, a map θ is a timeline map if it satisfies the following condition:
∀w1, w2 ∈ StratV
∀
. ∀xi ∈ V \ V∀. ∀ρ ∈ Hist.( ∀xj ∈ V∀ ∩ {xk | k < i}. ∀ρ′ ∈ Pref(ρ) ∪ {ρ}. w1(xj)(ρ) = w2(xj)(ρ)
∧ ∀xj ∈ V∀. ∀ρ′ ∈ Pref(ρ). w1(xj)(ρ) = w2(xj)(ρ)
)
⇒(
θ(w1)(xi)(ρ) = θ(w2)(xi)(ρ)
)
. (T)
Using those maps, we introduce the timeline semantics of SL[BG][:
G, q |=T ϕ iff ∃θ satisfying (T). ∀w ∈ StratV∀ . G, q |=θ(w) ξ
(
βjϕj
)
j≤n
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q0
a
b
p1
p2
Figure 5 |=E and |=T differ on SL[CG][
q0
a
b
p1
p2
Figure 6 |=E and |=T differ on SL[DG][
Such a map, if any, is called a T-witness of ϕ for G and q. As in the previous section, since
Property (E) implies Property (T), we get that an E-witness is also a T-witness, so that
G, q |=E ϕ⇒ G, q |=T ϕ for any formula ϕ ∈ SL[BG][.
I Example 2. Consider again the game of Fig 1 in Section 2. We have seen that G, q0 |=C ϕ
in Section 2, and that G, q0 6|=E ϕ in the proof of Prop. 3. With timeline dependences, we
have G, q0 |=T ϕ. Indeed, now θ(w)(z)(q0 · q2) may depend on w(xA)(q0) and w(xB)(q0):
we could then have e.g. θ(w)(z)(q0 · q2) = p1 when w(xA)(q0) = q2, and θ(w)(z)(q0 · q2) = p2
when w(xA)(q0) = q1. It is easily checked that this map is a T -witness of ϕ for q0.
Comparison of |=E and |=T . As explained at the end of Section 3, the proof of Prop. 2
actually shows the following result:
I Proposition 4. For any game G with initial state q0, and any formula ϕ ∈ SL[1G][, it holds
G, q0 |=E ϕ⇔ G, q0 |=T ϕ.
We now prove that this does not extend to SL[CG][ and SL[DG][:
I Proposition 5. The relations |=E and |=T differ on SL[CG][, as well as on SL[DG][.
Proof. For SL[CG][, we consider the game structure of Fig. 5, and formula
ϕC = ∃y. ∀xA. ∃xB .
∧{assign( 7→ y; 7→ xA). F p1
assign( 7→ y; 7→ xB). F p2
We first notice that G, q0 6|=E ϕC : indeed, in order to satisfy the first goal under any choice
of xA, the strategy for y has to point to p1 from both a and b. But then no choice of xB will
make the second goal true.
On the other hand, considering the timeline semantics, strategy y after q0 · a and q0 · b
may depend on the choice of xA in q0. When w(xA)(q0) = a, we let θ(w)(y)(q0 · a) = p1 and
θ(w)(y)(q0 · b) = p2 and θ(w)(xB)(q0) = b, which makes both goals hold true. Conversely, if
w(xA)(q0) = b, then we let θ(w)(y)(q0 ·b) = p1 and θ(w)(y)(q0 ·a) = p2 and θ(w)(xB)(q0) = a.
For SL[DG][, we consider the game of Fig. 6, and easily prove that formula ϕD below has
a T-witness but no E-witness:
ϕD = ∃y. ∀xA. ∀xB . ∀z.
∨{assign( 7→ y; 7→ xA; 7→ z). F p1
assign( 7→ y; 7→ xB ; 7→ z). F p2
J
The syntactic vs. semantic negations. While both semantics differ, we now prove that
the situation w.r.t. the syntactic vs. semantic negations is similar. First, following Prop. 4
and 2, the two negations coincide on SL[1G][ under the timeline semantics. Moreover:
I Proposition 6. For any formula ϕ in SL[BG][, for any game G and any state q0, we have
G, q0 |=T ϕ⇒ G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ.
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Sketch of proof. Write ϕ = (Qixi)1≤i≤lξ(βjϕj)j≤n. For a contradiction, assume that there
exist two maps θ and θ witnessing G, q0 |=T ϕ and G, q0 |=T ¬ϕ, respectively. Then for
any strategy valuations w and w for V∀ and V∃, we have that G, q0 |=θ(w) ξ(βjϕj)j and
G, q0 |=θ(w) ¬ξ(βjϕj)j . We can then inductively (on histories and on the sequence of
quantified variables) build a strategy valuation χ on V such that θ(χ|V∀) = θ(χ|V∃) = χ.
Then under valuation χ, both ξ(βjϕj)j and ¬ξ(βjϕj)j hold in q0, which is impossible. J
I Proposition 7. There exists a formula ϕ ∈ SL[BG][, a (turn-based) game G and a state q0
such that G, q0 6|=T ϕ and G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ.
5 The fragment SL[EG][
In this section, we focus on the timeline semantics |=T . We exhibit a fragment SL[EG][ of
SL[BG][, containing SL[CG][ and SL[DG][, for which the syntactic and semantic negations
coincide, and for which we prove model-checking is in 2 -EXPTIME:
I Theorem 8. For any ϕ ∈ SL[EG][ and any state q0, it holds: G, q0 |=T ϕ⇔ G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ.
Moreover, model checking SL[EG][ for the timeline semantics is 2 -EXPTIME-complete.
5.1 Semi-stable sets.
For n ∈ N, we let {0, 1}n be the set of mappings from [1, n] to {0, 1}. We write 0n (or 0 if
the size n is clear) for the function that maps all integers in [1, n] to 0, and 1n (or 1) for
the function that maps [1, n] to 1. The size of f ∈ {0, 1}n is defined as |f | = ∑1≤i≤n f(i).
For two elements f and g of {0, 1}n, we write f ≤ g whenever f(i) = 1 implies g(i) = 1 for
all i ∈ [1, n]. Given Bn ⊆ {0, 1}n, we write ↑Bn = {g ∈ {0, 1}n | ∃f ∈ Bn, f ≤ g}. A set
Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n is upward-closed if Fn = ↑Fn. Finally, for f, g ∈ {0, 1}n, we define:
f : i 7→ 1− f(i) f uprise g : i 7→ min{f(i), g(i)} f g g : i 7→ max{f(i), g(i)}.
We then introduce the notion of semi-stable sets, on which the definition of SL[EG][ relies:
a set Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n is semi-stable if for any f and g in Fn, it holds that
∀s ∈ {0, 1}n. (f uprise s)g (g uprise s) ∈ Fn or (g uprise s)g (f uprise s) ∈ Fn.
1 0 1 1 1 0
f
s s
0 0 1 1 0 1
g
s s
0 0 1 1 1 0
(g uprise s)g (f uprise s)
1 0 1 1 0 1
(f uprise s)g (g uprise s)
Figure 7 Semi-stability: if f and g are in Fn,
then one of (g uprise s)g (f uprise s) and (f uprise s)g (g uprise s)
must be in Fn.
Semi-stability is illustrated on Fig. 7.
I Example 3. Obviously, the set {0, 1}n
is semi-stable, as well as the empty set.
For n = 2, the set {(0, 1), (1, 0)} is easily
seen not to be semi-stable: taking f = (0, 1)
and g = (1, 0) with s = (1, 0), we get
(fuprises)g(guprises) = (0, 0) and (guprises)g(fuprises) =
(1, 1). Similarly, {(0, 0), (1, 1)} is not semi-
stable. It can be checked that any other sub-
set of {0, 1}2 is semi-stable.
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We then define SL[EG][ 1 as follows:
SL[EG][ 3 ϕ ::= ∀x.ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ξ ξ ::= Fn((βi)1≤i≤n)
β ::= assign(σ). ψ ψ ::= ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | Xψ | ψUψ | p
where Fn ranges over semi-stable subsets of {0, 1}n, for all n ∈ N. The semantics of the
operator Fn is defined as
G, q |=χ Fn((βi)i≤n) ⇔ letting f ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. f(i) = 1 iff G, q |=χ βi, it holds f ∈ Fn.
Notice that if Fn would range over all subsets of {0, 1}n, then this definition would
exactly correspond to SL[BG][. Similarly, the case where Fn = {1n} corresponds to SL[CG][,
while Fn = {0, 1}n \ {0n} gives rise to SL[DG][.
I Example 4. Consider the following formula, expressing the existence of a Nash equilibrium
for two players with respective LTL objectives ψ1 and ψ2:
∃x1.∃x2.∀y1.∀y2.
∧{(assign(A1 7→ y1;A2 7→ x2).ψ1)⇒ (assign(A1 7→ x1;A2 7→ x2).ψ1)
(assign(A1 7→ x1;A2 7→ y2).ψ2)⇒ (assign(A1 7→ x1;A2 7→ x2).ψ2)
This formula has four goals, and it corresponds to the set
F 4 = {(a, b, c, d) ∈ {0, 1}4 | a ≤ b and c ≤ d}
Taking f = (1, 1, 0, 0) and g = (0, 0, 1, 1), with s = (1, 0, 1, 0) we have (f uprise s) g (g uprise s) =
(1, 0, 0, 1) and (g uprise s)g (f uprise s) = (0, 1, 1, 0), none of which is in F 4. Hence our formula is
not (syntactically) in SL[EG][.
I Proposition 9. SL[EG][ contains SL[AG][. The inclusion is strict (syntactically).
5.2 Properties of semi-stable sets
Transformation into an upward-closed set by bit flipping. Fix a vector b ∈ {0, 1}n.
We define the operation flipb : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that maps any vector f to (f uprise b)g (f uprise b).
In other terms, flipb flips the i-th bit of its argument if bi = 0, and keeps this bit unchanged
if bi = 1. In SL[EG][, flipping bits amounts to negating the corresponding goals. The first
part of the following lemma thus indicates that our definition for SL[EG][ is somewhat sound.
I Lemma 10. If Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n is semi-stable, then so is flipb(Fn). Moreover, for any
semi-stable set Fn, there exists B ∈ {0, 1}n such that flipB(Fn) is upward-closed (i.e. for
any f ∈ flipB(Fn) and any s ∈ {0, 1}n, we have f g s ∈ flipB(Fn)).
I Remark. Notice that being upward-closed is not a sufficient condition for being semi-stable.
For instance, the set Fn = ↑{(0, 0, 1, 1); (1, 1, 0, 0)} is not semi-stable.
1 We name our fragment SL[EG][ as it comes as a natural continuation after fragments SL[AG][ [16],
SL[BG][ [14], and SL[CG][ and SL[DG][ [15].
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Defining quasi-orders from semi-stable sets. For Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n, we write Fn for the
complement of Fn. Fix such a set Fn, and pick s ∈ {0, 1}n. For any h ∈ {0, 1}n, we define
Fn(h, s) = {h′ ∈ {0, 1}n | (huprise s)g (h′ uprise s) ∈ Fn}
Fn(h, s) = {h′ ∈ {0, 1}n | (huprise s)g (h′ uprise s) ∈ Fn}
Trivially Fn(h, s) ∩ Fn(h, s) = ∅ and Fn(h, s) ∪ Fn(h, s) = {0, 1}n. If we assume Fn to be
semi-stable, then the family (Fn(h, s))h∈{0,1}n enjoys the following property:
I Lemma 11. Fix a semi-stable set Fn and s ∈ {0, 1}n. For any h1, h2 ∈ {0, 1}n, either
Fn(h1, s) ⊆ Fn(h2, s) or Fn(h2, s) ⊆ Fn(h1, s).
Given a semi-stable set Fn and s ∈ {0, 1}n, we can use the inclusion relation of Lemma 11
to define a relation Fns (written s when Fn is clear) over the elements of {0, 1}n. It is
defined as follows: h1 s h2 if, and only if, Fn(h1, s) ⊆ Fn(h2, s).
This relation is a quasi-order: its reflexiveness and transitivity both follow from the
reflexiveness and transitivity of the inclusion relation ⊆. By Lemma 11, this quasi-order is
total. Intuitively, s orders the elements of {0, 1}n based on how “easy” it is to complete
their restriction to s so that the completion belongs to Fn. In particular, only the indices on
which s take value 1 are used to check whether h1 s h2: given h1, h2 ∈ {0, 1}n such that
(h1 uprise s) = (h2 uprise s), we have F(h1, s) = F(h2, s), and h1 =s h2.
I Example 5. Consider for instance the semi-stable set F 3 =
{(1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)} represented on the
figure opposite, and which can be shown to be semi-stable.
Fix s = (1, 1, 0). Then F3((0, 1, ?), s) = {0, 1}2 × {1}, while
F3((1, 1, ?), s) = F3((1, 0, ?), s) = {0, 1}3 and F3((0, 0, ?), s) =
∅. It follows that (0, 0, ?) s (0, 1, ?) s (1, 0, ?) =s (1, 1, ?). (0, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1)(1, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 1) F 3
5.3 Sketch of proof of Theorem 8
We encode the LTL formulas as parity automata, so that, by keeping track of a vector of
states of those automata, the goals to be fulfilled are encoded as parity winning conditions.
We use vectors s ∈ {0, 1}n to represent the set of goals still being “monitored” after a finite
history ρ: for the quasi-order s, there exist optimal elements bq,d,s that can be achieved
from a given state q with a vector of states d of the parity automata. There are two ways
for the goals given by bq,d,s to be fulfilled: either by satisfying all those goals along the
same outcome, or by partitioning them along different branches. This can be encoded in a
two-player parity game (as in the proof of Prop. 2); this has two consequences: first, we can
effectively compute values bq,d,s, which provides the 2 -EXPTIME algorithm (by checking
whether bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn); second, by determinacy of turn-based parity games, one player has
a winning strategy in each of those games. We derive timeline maps witnessing that the
optimal elements bq,d,s can be achieved, and timeline maps witnessing that better elements
cannot be reached. These maps can be combined into global timeline maps witnessing that
G, q0 |=T ϕ or G, q0 |=T ¬ϕ, depending whether bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn.
Finally, we prove that SL[EG][ is, in a sense, maximal for the first property of Theorem 8:
I Proposition 12. For any non-semi-stable boolean set Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n, there exists a SL[BG][
formula ϕ built on Fn, a game G and a state q0 such that G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ and G, q0 6|=T ϕ.
Whether SL[EG][ is also maximal for having a 2 -EXPTIME model-checking algorithm
remains open. Actually, we do not know if SL[BG][ model checking is decidable under the
timeline semantics. These questions will be part of our future works on this topic.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Section 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
I Proposition 2. For any game G with initial state q0, and any formula ϕ ∈ SL[1G][, it holds
G, q0 |=E ϕ⇔ G, q0 6|=E ¬ϕ.
Proof. We begin with intuitive explanations before going into full details. We encode the
satisfaction relation G, q0 |=E ϕ into a two-player turn-based parity game: the first player
of the parity game will be in charge of selecting the existentially-quantified strategies, and
her opponent will select the universally-quantified ones. This will be encoded by replacing
each state of G with a tree-shaped module as depicted on Fig. 8. Following the strategy
assignment of the SL[1G] formula ϕ, the strategies selected by those players will define a
unique play, along which the LTL objective has to be fulfilled; this verification is encoded
into a (doubly-exponential) parity automaton.
We prove that G, q0 |=E ϕ if, and only if, the first player wins; conversely, G, q0 6|=E ϕ if
the second player wins. Both claims crucially rely on the existence of memoryless optimal
strategies for two-player parity games. Finally, by determinacy of those games, we get the
expected result.
Building a turn-based parity game H from G and ϕ. For the rest of the proof, we fix a
game G and a SL[1G] formula ϕ = (Qixi)i≤lβϕ. Each state of G is replaced with a copy of
the quantification game depicted on Fig. 8. A quantification game Qϕ is formally defined as
follows:
they involve two players P∃ and P∀;
the set of states is Sϕ = {m ∈ Act∗ | 0 ≤ |m| ≤ l}, thereby defining a tree of depth l + 1
with directions Act. A state m in Sϕ with 0 ≤ |m| < l belongs to Player P∃ if, and only
if, Q|m|+1 = ∃. States with |m| = l will have only one outgoing transition.
from each m with 0 ≤ |m| < l, for all a ∈ Act, there is a transition to m·a. The empty word
ε ∈ Sϕ is the starting node of the quantification game, and has no incoming transitions;
states with |m| = l (currently) have no outgoing transitions.
A leaf (i.e., a state m with |m| = l) in a quantification game represents a move vector
of domain V = {xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ l}: we identify each leaf m with the move vector m, hence
ϕ = ∃x1. ∀x2. ∃x3. βψε
a b
aa ab ba bb
aaa aab aba abb baa bab bba bbb
Figure 8 The quantification game for ϕ = ∃x1. ∀x2. ∃x3. βψ.
P. Gardy, P. Bouyer, N.Markey 23:15
writing m(xi) for m(i).
We denote by D a deterministic parity automaton over 2AP associated with ϕ. We write d0
for the initial state of D. Using quantification games, we can now define the turn-based
parity game H:
it involves both players P∃ and P∀;
for each state q of G and each state d of D, H contains a copy of the quantification
game Qϕ, which we call the (q, d)-copy. Hence the set of states of H is the product of
the state spaces of G, D and Qϕ.
the transitions in H are of two types:
internal transitions in each copy of the quantification game are preserved;
consider a state (q, d,m) where |m| = l; this is a leaf in the quantification game. If
there exists a state q′ such that q′ = ∆(q,mβ) where mβ : Agt → Act is the move
vector over Agt defined by mβ(A) = m(i− 1) where xi = β(A) (i.e., assigning to each
player A ∈ Agt the action m(β(A))), then we add a transition from (q, d,m) to (q′, d′, ε)
where d′ is the state of D reached from d when reading lab(q′). Notice that (q, d,m)
then has at most one outgoing transition.
the priorities are inherited from those in D: state (q, d,m) has the same priority as d.
Correspondence between G and H. We define a correspondence between G and H through
the notion of lanes:
I Definition 13. A lane in G is a tuple (ρ, u, b, t) made of
a history ρ = (qj)0≤j≤a (for some integer a);
a function u : V × Pref(ρ)→ Act;
an integer b ∈ [0; l];
a function t : {x1, ..., xb} → Act (t is the empty function if b = 0);
and such that
∀0 ≤ j < a. ∆(qj , (mj(β(A)))A∈Agt) = qj+1 with mj : V → Act
x 7→ u(x, ρ≤j)
(1)
We can then build a one-to-one application HtoGp between histories in H and lanes in G.
With a history pi in H, written
pi =
( ∏
0≤j<a
∏
0≤i≤l
(qj , dj ,mj,i)
)
·
∏
0≤i≤b
(qa, da,ma,i),
having length a · (l+1)+b+1 with 0 ≤ b < l, we associate a lane HtoGp(pi) = ((qj)j≤a, u, b, t)
with
u : V × Pref(ρ)→ Act t : {x1, ..., xb} → Act
xi, (qj)j≤c 7→ mc,i (∀c < a) xi 7→ ma,i
The resulting function HtoGp is clearly injective (different histories will correspond to
different lanes), but also surjective. To prove the latter statement, we build the inverse
function GtoHp: for a lane ((qj)j≤a, u, b, t), we set GtoHp((qj)j≤a, u, b, t) = pi where pi is the
history in H of length a · (l + 1) + b+ 1 defined as
pi =
∏
0≤j<a
∏
0≤i≤l
(
qj , dj , u(xi, (qj′)j′≤j)
) · ∏
0≤i≤b
(
qa, da, t(xi, (qj)j≤a)
)
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where dj is the state of D reached on input (qk)0≤k≤j−1.
Because of the coherence condition (1), GtoHp((qj)j≤a, u, i, t) is indeed a history in H.
From the definitions, one can easily check that
GtoHp(HtoGp(pi)) = pi
and deduce that GtoHp is the inverse function of HtoGp; therefore
I Lemma 14. The application HtoGp is a bijection between lanes of G and histories in H,
and GtoHp is its inverse function.
Extending the correspondence. We can useHtoGp to describe another correspondence HtoG
between (positional) strategies for P∃ in H and (elementary) maps in G. Remember that a
map is a function θ : (HistG → Act)V∀ → (HistG → Act)V . Remember also that if Qj = ∀, then
θ(w)(xi)(ρ) = w(xi)(ρ), so that we only have to define the map for the existentially-quantified
variables.
Formally, the application HtoG takes as input a strategy δ for player P∃ in H, and returns
a map in G. It will enjoy the following properties:
for any finite outcome pi of δ in H ending at the root of a quantification game, there exists
a function w such that HtoGp(pi) = (ρ, u, 0, t∅) where ρ is the outcome of HtoG(δ)(w)
in G under the assignment defined by β;
conversely, for any path ρ in G that is an outcome of HtoG(δ)(w) for some w and under
the assignment defined by β, then letting u(x, ρ′) = HtoG(δ)(w)(x)(ρ′), we have that
(ρ, u, 0, t∅) is a lane in G and GtoHp(ρ, u, 0, t∅) is an outcome of δ in H ending in the root
of a quantification game.
We fix δ, and for all w, ρ and xi, we define HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(ρ) by a double induction,
first on the length of the history ρ in G, and second on the sequence of variables xi.
initial step: we begin with the case where ρ is the single state q0. We proceed by
induction on existentially-quantified variables, merging the initialization step with the
induction step as they are similar. Consider an existentially-quantified variable xi in V.
Given w : V∀ × Pref(ρ) ∪ {ρ} → Act, we define a function ti,w : [x1;xi−1] → Act such
that ti,w(x) = w(x, q0) for x ∈ V∀ ∩ [x1;xi−1], and ti,w(x) = HtoG(δ)(w)(x)(q0) for
x ∈ V∃ ∩ [x1;xi−1], assuming that they have been defined in the previous induction steps
on variables. We can then create the lane lanei,w = (ε, u∅, i− 1, t) and define
HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(q0) = δ(GtoHp(lanei,w))
Pick an outcome pi of δ in H of length l+ 2, and write m for its l+ 1-st state: it defines a
valuation for the variables in V , hence defining a move vector mβ under the assignment β.
in Act. By construction of H, this outcome ends in the state (q1, d1, ε) where q1 =
∆(q0,mβ) and d1 is the successor of the initial state d0 of D when reading lab(q1). We now
prove that q0 · q1 is the outcome of HtoG(δ)(w) for some w. For this, we let w(xi) = mi
for all xi ∈ V∀. By construction, HtoG(δ)(w)(xj)(q0) precisely corresponds to m(j), for
all xj ∈ V∃. In the end, under assignment β, HtoG(δ)(w) precisely returns the move
vector mβ , hence proving our result.
The proof of the converse statement follows similar arguments: consider an outcome
ρ = q0 · q1 of HtoG(δ)(w) for some w. The lane (ρ, u, 0, t∅) defined with u(x, q0) =
HtoG(δ)(w)(x)(q0) then corresponds through GtoHp to a play ending in (q1, d1, ε), and
visiting the leaf m defined as mi = u(xi, q0). By construction, this is an outcome of δ
in H.
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induction step: we consider a history ρ in G, assuming we have define HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(ρ′)
for all prefixes ρ′ of ρ, for all w and all variables xi. We now define HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(ρ),
by induction on the list of variables. Again, the initialization step is merged with the
induction step as they rely on the same arguments.
Consider an existentially-quantified variable xi, and w : V∀ × Pref(ρ) ∪ {ρ} → Act.
We define a function ti,w : [x1;xi−1]→ Act where ti,w associate with x ∈ V∀ ∩ [x1;xi−1]
the action w(x)(pi), and with x ∈ V∃ ∩ [x1;xi−1] the action HtoG(δ)(w)(x)(ρ). We also
define uw : V × Pref(ρ) → Act as uw(x, ρ′) = HtoG(δ)(w)(x)(ρ′), for all prefixes ρ′ of ρ.
We can then create the lane lanei,w = (pi, uw, i− 1, ti,w) and finally define
HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(ρ) = δ(GtoHp(lanei,w)).
Using the same arguments as in the initial step, we prove our correspondence between
the outcomes of δ in H and the outcomes of HtoG(δ) in G.
Notice that in the construction above, HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(ρ) may depend on the value
of w(xj , ρ′) for j > i and ρ′ ∈ Pref(ρ): indeed, in the inductive definition, we define
HtoG(δ)(w)(xj)(ρ′) before defining HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(ρ). Hence in general HtoG(δ) is not en
elementary map.
However, in case δ is memoryless, we notice that HtoG(δ)(w)(xi)(ρ) only depends on
value of δ in the last state of the lane lanei,w, hence in particular not on uw. This removes
the above dependence, and makes HtoG(δ) elementary.
Finally, notice that we can define a dual correspondence HtoG relating strategies of
Player P∀ and elementary maps in G where existential and universal variables are swapped.
Concluding the proof. Using HtoG, we prove our final correspondence between H and G:
I Lemma 15. Assume that P∃ is winning in H and let δ be a positional winning strategy.
Then the elementary map HtoG(δ) is a witness that G, q0 |=E ϕ.
Similarly, assume that P∀ is winning in H and let δ be a positional winning strategy.
Then the elementary map HtoG(δ) is a witness that G, q0 |=E ¬ϕ.
Proof. We prove the first point, the second one following similar arguments. Assume that
P∃ is winning in H, and pick a memoryless winning strategy δ. Toward a contradiction,
assume further that HtoG(δ) is not a witness of G, q0 |=E ϕ. Then there exists w0 : V∀ →
(HistG → Act) s.t. G, q0 6|=HtoG(δ)(w0) βϕ. We use w0 to build a strategy δ for Player P∀ in H.
Given a history
pi =
∏
0≤j<a
∏
0≤i≤l
(qj , dj ,mj,i) ·
∏
0≤i≤b
(qa, da,ma,i)
in H, we define ρ = ∏0≤j≤a qj and set δ(pi) = HtoG(δ)(w)(xb)(η) where
w : Pref(ρ) ∪ {ρ} × (V∀ ∩ [x1;xb])→ Act is such that w(ρ′, xi) is the action to be played
for going from pi≤|ρ′|·(l+1)+i−1 to pi≤|ρ′|·(l+1)+i in H;
η =
∏
0≤j<a
∏
0≤i≤l(qj , dj ,mj,i)).
Write ν = (qj)j∈N for the outcome of θ(w0) under strategy assignment β in G. Then,
by construction of δ, the outcome of δ and δ in H will visit the (qj , dj)j∈N-copies of the
quantification game, where dj is the state reached by reading (qj′)j′≤j in the deterministic
automaton D. Now, since G, q0 6|=HtoG(δ)(w0) βϕ, we get that ν does not satisfy ϕ and
therefore the outcome of δ and δ in H does not satisfy the parity condition. This is in
contradiction with δ being the winning strategy of P∃, and proves that HtoG(δ) must be a
witness that G, q0 |=E ϕ. J
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Proposition 15, together with the determinacy of parity games [9, 18] immediately imply
that at least one of ϕ and ¬ϕ must hold in G for |=E . This concludes our proof. J
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
I Proposition 3. The relations |=C and |=E differ on SL[CG][, as well as on SL[DG][.
Proof. The proof of Prop. 1 provides an example of a game and a formula in SL[CG][ where
|=C and |=E differ. We prove the result for SL[DG][: consider again the game of Fig. 1 in
Section 2. We already proved that G, q0 |=C ϕ; we show that G, q0 6|=E ϕ. For this, consider
the following four valuations for the universally-quantified strategies:
w1(xA)(q0) = q1 w1(xB)(q0) = q2 w1(y)(q0 · q1) = p2
w2(xA)(q0) = q2 w2(xB)(q0) = q1 w2(y)(q0 · q1) = p1
(assuming that they coincide in any other situation). Let θ be an elementary ϕ-map: then it
must be such that θ(w1)(z)(q0 · q2) = θ(w2)(z)(q0 · q2). Then:
if θ(w1)(z)(q0 · q2) = θ(w2)(z)(q0 · q2) = p1, then the first goal goes to p2 via q1, and the
second goal goes to p1 via q2. None of those goals is fulfilled;
if θ(w1)(z)(q0 · q2) = θ(w2)(z)(q0 · q2) = p2, then the first goal goes to p2 via q2, and the
second goal goes to p1 via q1. Again, both goals are missed. J
B Proofs of Section 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 6
I Proposition 6. For any formula ϕ in SL[BG][, for any game G and any state q0, we have
G, q0 |=T ϕ⇒ G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ.
Proof. For a contradiction, assume that there exist two maps θ and θ witnessing G, q0 |=T ϕ
and G, q0 |=T ¬ϕ resp. Then
∀w : V∀ → (Hist→ Act). G, q0 |=θ(w) ξ(βjϕj)j≤n (2)
∀w : V∃ → (Hist→ Act). G, q0 |=θ(w) ¬ξ(βjϕj)j≤n (3)
From θ and θ, we build a strategy valuation χ on V such that θ(χ|V∀) = θ(χ|V∃) = χ.
By Equations (2) and (3), we get that G, q0 |=χ ξ(βjϕj)j≤n and G, q0 |=χ ¬ξ(βjϕj)j≤n, which
for LTL formulas is impossible.
We define χ(x)(ρ) inductively on histories and on the list of quantified variables. When ρ
is the empty history q0, we consider two cases:
if x1 ∈ V∀, then θ(w)(x1)(q0) does not depend on w at all, since θ is a timeline-map.
Hence we let χ(x1)(q0) = θ(w)(x1)(q0), for any w.
similarly, if x1 ∈ V∃, we let χ(x1)(q0) = θ(w)(x1)(q0), which again does not depend on w.
Similarly, when χ(x)(q0) has been defined for all x ∈ {x1, ..., xi−1}, we again consider two
cases:
if xi ∈ V∀, we define w(xj)(q0) = χ(xj)(q0) for all xj ∈ V∃ ∩ {x1, ..., xi−1}, and let
χ(xi)(q0) = θ(w)(xi)(q0), which again does not depend on the value of w besides those
defined above;
symmetrically, if xi ∈ V∃, we define w(xj)(q0) = χ(xj)(q0) for all xj ∈ V∀ ∩{x1, ..., xi−1},
and let χ(xi)(q0) = θ(w)(xi)(q0).
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q0
q1 q2
p1 p2 p3 p4
ϕ = ∀x1.∃y1.∃y2.∃x2.
∧

assign( 7→ y1; 7→ x1)F p2
⇒ assign( 7→ y2; 7→ x2)F p1
assign( 7→ y1; 7→ x1)F p3
⇒ assign( 7→ y2; 7→ x2)F p4
Figure 9 A game G and a formula ϕ such that G, q0 |=T ϕ and G, q0 |=T ¬ϕ
Notice that this indeed enforces that θ(χ|V∀)(xi)(q0) = χ(xi)(q0) when xi ∈ V∃, and
θ(χ|V∃)(xi)(q0) = χ(xi)(q0) when xi ∈ V∀.
The induction step is proven similarly: consider a history ρ and a variable xi, assuming
that χ has been defined for all variables on all prefixes of ρ, and for variables in {x1, ..., xi−1}
on ρ itself. Then:
if xi ∈ V∀, we define w(xj)(ρ′) = χ(xj)(ρ′) for all xj ∈ V and all ρ′ ∈ Pref(ρ), and
w(xj)(ρ) = χ(xj)(ρ) for all xj ∈ V∃ ∩{x1, ..., xi−1}. We then let χ(xi)(ρ) = θ(w)(xi)(q0),
which does not depend on the value of w besides those defined above;
the construction for the case when xi ∈ V∃ is similar.
As in the initial step, it is easy to check that this construction enforces θ(χ|V∀) = θ(χ|V∃) = χ,
as required. J
B.2 Proof of Proposition 7
I Proposition 7. There exists a formula ϕ ∈ SL[BG][, a (turn-based) game G and a state q0
such that G, q0 6|=T ϕ and G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ.
Proof. Consider the turn-based game G and the SL[BG][ formula ϕ of Fig. 9. First, G, q0 |=T
ϕ, since for any choice of x1 and y1, one of the goals holds vacuously, and the other one
can be made true by correctly selecting y2 and x2. We now prove that G, q0 |=T ¬ϕ: since
timeline dependences are allowed, θ(w)(x1)(q0 · q1) and θ(w)(x1)(q0 · q2) may depend on the
values of w(y1)(q0) and w(y2)(q0). We thus consider four cases:
if w(y1)(q0) = w(y2)(q0) = q1, then we let θ(w)(x1)(q0 · q1) = p3; then the second goal
of ϕ is not fulfilled, whatever w(x2);
if w(y1)(q0) = w(y2)(q0) = q2, then symmetrically, we let θ(w)(x1)(q0 · q2) = p2, so that
the first goal of ϕ fails to hold for any w(x2);
if w(y1)(q0) = q1 and w(y2)(q0) = q2, then we let θ(w)(x1)(q0 · q1) = p2, and again the
first goal holds, whatever w(x2);
if w(y1)(q0) = q2 and w(y2)(q0) = q1, then we let θ(w)(x1)(q0 · q2) = p3, and again the
second goal fails to hold independently of w(x2). J
C Proofs of Section 5
C.1 Proof of Proposition 9
I Proposition 9. SL[EG][ contains SL[AG][. The inclusion is strict (syntactically).
Proof. Remember that boolean combinations in SL[AG][ follow the grammar ξ ::= ξ ∨ β |
ξ ∧ β | β. In terms of subsets of {0, 1}n, it corresponds to considering sets defined in one of
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the following two forms:
Fnξ = {f ∈ {0, 1}n | f(n) = 1} ∪ {g ∈ {0, 1}n | g|[1;n−1] ∈ Fn−1ξ′ }
Fnξ = {f ∈ {0, 1}n | f(n) = 1 and f|[1;n−1] ∈ Fn−1ξ′ }
depending whether ξ(pj)j = ξ′(pj)j ∨ pn or ξ(pj)j = ξ′(pj)j ∧ pn. Assuming (by induction)
that Fn−1ξ′ is semi-stable, then we can prove that Fnξ also is. We detail the proof for the
second case, the first case being similar.
Consider the case where Fnξ = {f ∈ {0, 1}n | f(n) = 1 and f|[1;n−1] ∈ Fn−1ξ′ }. Pick
any two elements f and g in Fnξ , and s ∈ {0, 1}n. Since f(n) = g(n) = 1, we have
[(fuprises)g (guprises)](n) = [(fuprises)g (guprises)](n) = 1. Moreover, the restriction of [(fuprises)g (guprises)]
and of [(f uprise s) g (g uprise s)] to their first n − 1 bits is computed from the restriction of f , g
and s to their first n− 1 bits. Since Fn−1ξ′ is semi-stable, one of [(f uprise s)g (g uprise s)][1;n−1] and
[(fuprises)g(guprises)][1;n−1] belongs to Fn−1ξ′ , so that one of [(fuprises)g(guprises)] and [(fuprises)g(guprises)]
is in Fnξ .
That the inclusion is strict is proven by considering the semi-stable set H3 = {(1, 1, 1),
(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)}. Assume that it corresponds to a formula in SL[AG][: then the
boolean combination ξ(x1, x2, x3) of that formula must be in one of the following forms:
ξ′(x1, x2) ∧ x3 ξ′(x1, x2) ∨ x3 ξ′(x1, x2) ∧ ¬x3 ξ′(x1, x2) ∨ ¬x3.
It remains to prove that none of these cases corresponds to H3: the first case does not allow
(1, 1, 0); the second case allows (0, 0, 1); the third case does not allow (1, 0, 1); the last case
allows (0, 0, 0). J
C.2 Proof of Lemma 10
The proof of Lemma 10 will make use of the following intermediary results. The first lemma
shows that SL[EG][ is closed under (syntactic) negation.
I Lemma 16. Fn is semi-stable if, and only if, its complement is.
Proof. Assume Fn is not semi-stable, and pick f and g in Fn and s ∈ {0, 1}n such that
none of α = (f uprise s) g (g uprise s) and γ = (g uprise s) g (f uprise s) are in Fn. It cannot be the case
that g = f , as this would imply α = f ∈ Fn. Hence α 6= γ. We claim that α and γ are our
witnesses for showing that the complement of Fn is not semi-stable: both of them belong to
the complement of Fn, and (αuprise s)g (γ uprise s) can be seen to equal f , hence it is not in the
complement of Fn. Similarly for (γ uprise s)g (αuprise s) = g. J
I Lemma 17. If Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n is semi-stable, then for any s ∈ {0, 1}n and any non-empty
subset Hn of Fn, it holds that
∃f ∈ Hn. ∀g ∈ Hn. (f uprise s)g (g uprise s) ∈ Fn.
Proof. For a contradiction, assume that there exist s ∈ {0, 1}n and Hn ⊆ Fn such that, for
any f ∈ Hn, there is an element g ∈ Hn for which (f uprise s)g (g uprise s) /∈ Fn. Then there must
exist a minimal integer 2 ≤ λ ≤ |Hn| and λ elements {fi | 1 ≤ i ≤ λ} of Hn such that
∀1 ≤ i ≤ λ− 1 (fi uprise s)g (fi+1 uprise s) 6∈ Fn and (fλ uprise s)g (f1 uprise s) 6∈ Fn.
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By Lemma 16, the complement of Fn is semi-stable. Hence, considering (fλ−1uprise s)g (fλuprise s)
and (fλ uprise s)g (f1 uprise s), one of the following two vectors is not in Fn:(
[(fλ−1 uprise s)g (fλ uprise s)]uprise s
)
g
(
[(fλ uprise s)g (f1 uprise s)]uprise s
)(
[(fλ uprise s)g (f1 uprise s)]uprise s
)
g
(
[(fλ−1 uprise s)g (fλ uprise s)]uprise s
)
The second expression equals fλ, which is in Fn. Hence we get that (fλ−1 uprise s)g (f1 uprise s) is
not in Fn, contradicting minimality of λ. J
I Lemma 10. If Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n is semi-stable, then so is flipb(Fn). Moreover, for any
semi-stable set Fn, there exists B ∈ {0, 1}n such that flipB(Fn) is upward-closed (i.e. for
any f ∈ flipB(Fn) and any s ∈ {0, 1}n, we have f g s ∈ flipB(Fn)).
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Assume that Fn is semi-stable, and take f ′ =
flipb(f) and g′ = flipb(g) in flipb(Fn), and s ∈ {0, 1}n. Then
(f ′ uprise s)g (g′ uprise s) =
(
((f uprise b)g (f uprise b))uprise s
)
g
(
((g uprise b)g (g uprise b))uprise s
)
= (((f uprise s)g (g uprise s))uprise b)g
(
((f uprise s)g (g uprise s))uprise b
)
Write α = (f uprise s) g (g uprise s) and β = (f uprise s) g (g uprise s). One can easily check that β = α.
We then have
(f ′ uprise s)g (g′ uprise s) = (αuprise b)g
(
αuprise b
)
= flipb(α). (4)
This computation being valid for any f and g, we also have
(g′ uprise s)g (f ′ uprise s) = (γ uprise b)g
(
γ uprise b
)
= flipb(γ) (5)
with γ = (g uprise s) g (f uprise s). By hypothesis, at least one of α and γ belongs to Fn, so that
also at least one of (f ′ uprise s)g (g′ uprise s) and (g′ uprise s)g (f ′ uprise s) belongs to flipb(Fn).
The second statement of Lemma 10 trivially holds for Fn = ∅; thus in the following, we
assume Fn to be non-empty. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let si ∈ {0, 1}n be the vector such that si(j) = 1
if, and only if, j = i. Applying Lemma 17, we get that for any i, there exists some fi ∈ Fn
such that for any f ∈ Fn, it holds
(fi uprise si)g (f uprise si) ∈ Fn. (6)
We fix such a family (fi)i≤n then define g ∈ {0, 1}n as g =
b
1≤i≤n(fi uprise si), i.e. g(i) = fi(i)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Starting from any element of Fn and applying Equation (6) iteratively for
each i, we get that g ∈ Fn. Since g uprise si = fi uprise si, we also have
∀f ∈ Fn (g uprise si)g (f uprise si) ∈ Fn
By Equation (5), since flipg(g) = 1, we get
∀f ∈ Fn (1uprise si)g (flipg(f)uprise si) ∈ flipg(Fn). (7)
Now, assume that flipg(Fn) is not upward closed: then there exist elements f ∈ Fn and
h /∈ Fn such that flipg(f)(i) = 1⇒ flipg(h)(i) = 1 for all i. Starting from f and iteratively
applying Equation (7) for those i for which flipg(h)(i) = 1 and flipg(f)(i) = 0, we get that
flipg(h) ∈ flipg(Fn) and h ∈ Fn. Hence flipg(Fn) must be upward closed. J
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C.3 Proof of Lemma 11
I Lemma 11. Fix a semi-stable set Fn and s ∈ {0, 1}n. For any h1, h2 ∈ {0, 1}n, either
Fn(h1, s) ⊆ Fn(h2, s) or Fn(h2, s) ⊆ Fn(h1, s).
Proof. Assume otherwise, there is h′1 ∈ Fn(h1, s)\Fn(h2, s) and h′2 ∈ Fn(h2, s)\Fn(h1, s).
We then have:
(h1 uprise s)g (h′1 uprise s) ∈ Fn (h2 uprise s)g (h′1 uprise s) 6∈ Fn
(h2 uprise s)g (h′2 uprise s) ∈ Fn (h1 uprise s)g (h2 uprise s) 6∈ Fn
Now consider (h1 uprise s)g (h′1 uprise s), (h2 uprise s)g (h′2 uprise s) and s. As Fn is semi-stable, one of
the two following vector is in Fn :(
(h1 uprise s)g (h′1 uprise s)uprise s
)
g
(
(h2 uprise s)g (h′2 uprise s)uprise s
)(
(h2 uprise s)g (h′2 uprise s)uprise s
)
g
(
(h1 uprise s)g (h′1 uprise s)uprise s
)
The first vector is equal to (h1 uprise s)g (h′2 uprise s) and the second to (h2 uprise s)g (h′1 uprise s) and both
are supposed to be in Fn, we get a contradiction. J
While it is not related to the lemma above, we prove here a result that will be useful for
the proof of Lemma 24 in Appendix C.4.
I Lemma 18. Given a semi-stable set Fn, s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}n such that s1 uprise s2 = 0 and
f, g ∈ {0, 1}n such that f s1 g and f s2 g. Then f s1gs2 g.
Proof. Because f s1 g and f s2 g, we have
∀i ∈ {1, 2} ∀h ∈ {0, 1}n (f uprise si)g (huprise si) ∈ Fn ⇒ (g uprise si)g (huprise si) ∈ Fn (8)
Consider h′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that α = (f uprise (s1 g s2)) g (h′ uprise (s1 g s2)) is in Fn. Define the
element h = α uprise s2, then (f uprise s2) g (h uprise s2) = (f uprise (s1 g s2)) g (h′ uprise (s1 g s2)) ∈ Fn.
Using (8) with s2 and h, we get β = (g uprise s2) g (h uprise s2). As s1 uprise s2 = 0, we can write
β = (f uprise s1)g (g uprise s2)g (h′ uprise (s1 g s2)) ∈ Fn.
Now consider h = β uprise s1, we have (f uprise s1)g (huprise s1) = β ∈ Fn. Using (8) with s1 and
h, we get (g uprise (s1 g s2))g (h′ uprise (s1 g s2)) ∈ Fn. Therefore Fn(f, s1 g s2) ⊆ Fn(g, s1 g s2)
and f s1gs2 g. J
C.4 Proof of Theorem 8
I Theorem 8. For any ϕ ∈ SL[EG][ and any state q0, it holds: G, q0 |=T ϕ⇔ G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ.
Moreover, model checking SL[EG][ for the timeline semantics is 2 -EXPTIME-complete.
Proof. Following Lemma 10, we assume for the rest of the proof that the set Fn of the
SL[EG][ formula ϕ is upward closed (even if it means negating some of the LTL objectives).
We also assume it is non-empty, since the result is trivial otherwise.
We then have the following property:
I Lemma 19. Assuming Fn is upward-closed, for any f , g and s in {0, 1}n, if f ≤ g (i.e.
for all i, f(i) = 1⇒ g(i) = 1), then f s g. In particular, 0 is a minimal element for s,
for any s.
Proof. Since f ≤ g, then also (f uprise s)g (huprise s) ≤ (guprise s)g (huprise s), for any h ∈ {0, 1}n. Since
Fn is upward-closed, if (f uprise s)g (huprise s) is in Fn, then so is (g uprise s)g (huprise s). J
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We now develop the proof of Theorem 8. The proof is in three steps:
we build a family of parity automata expressing the objectives that may have to be
fulfilled along outcomes. A configuration is then described by a state q of the game,
a vector d of states of those parity automata, and a set s of goals that are still active
along the current outcome;
we define formulas encoding the two ways of fulfilling a set of goals: either by fulfilling
all goals along the same outcome, or by partitioning them among different branches;
by turning the formulas above into 2-player parity games, we inductively compute optimal
sets of goals (represented as vectors bq,d,s ∈ {0, 1}n) that can be achieved from a given
configuration and for each subset of active goals. By determinacy of parity games,
we derive timeline maps witnessing the fact that bq,d,s can be achieved, and the fact that
it is optimal. If bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn, we get a witness map for G, q0 |=T ϕ; otherwise, we get
one for G, q0 |=T ¬ϕ.
C.4.1 Automata for conjunctions of goals
We use deterministic parity word automata to keep track of the goals to be satisfied. Since we
initially have no clue about which goal(s) will have to be fulfilled along an outcome, we use a
(large) set of automata, all running in parallel.
For s ∈ {0, 1}n and h ∈ {0, 1}n, we let Ds,h be a deterministic parity automaton accepting
exactly the words over 2AP along which the following formula Φs,h holds:
Φs,h =
∨
k∈{0,1}n
h s k
∧
j s.t.
(kuprises)(j)=1
ϕj .
where a conjunction over an empty set (i.e., if (k uprise s)(j) = 0 for all j) is true. Notice that,
using Lemma 19, if h s k and k ≤ k′, then h s k′, so that we do not need to enforce 6 ϕj
for those indices where (k uprise s)(j) = 0.
As an example, take s ∈ {0, 1}n with |s| = 1, writing j for the index where s(j) = 1;
for any h ∈ {0, 1}n, if there is k s h with k(j) = 0 (which in particular is the case when
h(j) = 0), then the automaton Ds,h is universal; otherwise Ds,h accepts the set of words
over 2AP along which ϕj holds.
We write D = {Ds,h | s ∈ {0, 1}n, h ∈ {0, 1}n} for the set of automata defined above.
A vector of states of D is a function associating with each automaton D ∈ D one of its states.
We write VS for the set of all vectors of states of D. For any vector d ∈ VS and any state q
of G, we let succ(d, q) to be the vector of states associating with each D ∈ D the successor
of state d(D) after reading lab(q); we extend succ to finite paths (qi)0≤i≤n in G inductively,
letting succ(d, (qi)0≤i≤n) = succ(succ(d, (qi)0≤i≤n−1), qn).
An infinite path (qi)i∈N in G is accepted by an automaton D of D whenever the word
(lab(qi))i∈N is accepted by D. We write L(D) for the set of paths of G accepted by D. Finally,
for d ∈ VS, we write L(Dds,h) for the set of words that are accepted by Ds,h starting from
the state d(Ds,h) of Ds,h.
I Proposition 20. The following holds for any s ∈ {0, 1}n:
1. Φs,0 ≡ > (i.e., Ds,0 is universal);
2. for any h1, h2 ∈ {0, 1}n, if h1 s h2, we have Φs,h2 ⇒ Φs,h1 (i.e., L(Ds,h2) ⊆ L(Ds,h1));
3. for any h ∈ Fn, Φ1,h ≡
∨
k∈Fn
∧
j s.t. k(j)=1 ϕj.
Proof. Φs,0 contains the empty conjunction (k = 0) as a disjunct. Hence it is equivalent
to true. When h1 s h2, formula Φs,h1 contains more disjuncts than Φs,h2 , hence the second
CVIT 2016
23:24 Dependences in Strategy Logic
result. Finally, Fn(f,1) = {0, 1}n if f ∈ Fn, and is empty otherwise. Hence if h ∈ Fn,
we have h 1 k if, and only if, k ∈ Fn, which entails the result. J
C.4.2 Two ways of achieving goals
After a given history, a set of goals may be achieved either along a single outcome, in case
the assignment of strategies to players gives rise to the same outcomes, or they may be split
among different outcomes. We express those two ways of satisfying goals, by means of two
operators parameterized by the current configuration.
The first operator covers the case where the goals currently enabled by s (those goals βiϕi
for which s(i) = 1) are all fulfilled along the same outcome. For any d ∈ VS and any two s
and h in {0, 1}n, the operator Γstickd,s,h is defined as follows: given a context χ with V ⊆ dom(χ)
and a state q of G,
G, q |=χ Γstickd,s,h ⇔ ∃ρ ∈ PlayG(q) s.t.
{
– ∀j ≤ n. (s(j) = 1⇒ out(q, χ ◦ βj) = ρ)
– ρ ∈ L(Dds,h)
Intuitively, all the goals enabled by s must give rise to the same outcome, which is accepted
by Dds,h.
We now consider the case where the active goals are partitioned among different outcomes.
I Definition 21. A partition of an element s ∈ {0, 1}n is a sequence (sκ)1≤κ≤λ, with λ ≥ 2,
of elements of {0, 1}n with s1g . . .g sλ = s and where for any two κ 6= κ′ and any 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
we have sκ(j) = 1⇒ sκ′(j) = 0.
An extended partition of s is a sequence τ = (sκ, qκ, dκ)1≤κ≤λ of elements of {0, 1}n ×
Q× VS where (sκ)1≤κ≤λ is a partition of s, qκ are states of G, and dκ are vectors of states
of the automata in D.
We write Part(s) for the set of all extended partitions of s. Notice that we only consider
non-trivial partitions; in particular, if |s| ≤ 1, then Part(s) = ∅. For any d ∈ VS, any s in
{0, 1}n and any set of partitions Υs of s, the operator Γsepd,s,Υs states that the goals currently
enabled by s all follow a common history ρ for a finite number of steps, and then partition
themselves according to some partition in Υs. The semantics of Γsepd,s,Υs is defined as follows:
G, q |=χ Γsepd,s,Υs ⇔
∃τ ∈ Υs.
∃ρ ∈ HistG(q).

– ∀j ≤ n. (s(j) = 1⇒ ρ ∈ Pref(out(q, χ ◦ βj)))
– ∀κ ≤ |τ |. ∀j ≤ n. letting mj(A) = χ(βj(A))(ρ).(
sκ(j) = 1⇒ qκ = ∆(last(ρ),mj)
)
– ∀κ ≤ |τ |. succ(d, ρ · qκ) = dκ.
Notice that h does not appear explicitly in this definition, but Γsepd,s,Υs will depend on h
through the choice of Υs. The operators Γstick and Γsep are illustrated on Fig. 10.
C.4.3 Fulfilling optimal sets of goals
We now inductively (on |s|) define new operators Γd,s,h combining the above two operators
Γstick and Γsep, and selecting optimal ways of partitioning the goals among the outcomes.
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q |=χ Γstickd,s,h
∈ L(Dds,h)
same outcome for all
goals enabled by s
q |=χ Γsepd,s,Υs
common history ρ for
all goals enabled by s
q1, d1
s1
q2, d2
s2
q3, d3
s3
∈ Υs
Figure 10 Illustration of Γstickd,s,h and Γsepd,s,Υs
Base case: |s| = 1.
When only one goal is enabled, we only have to consider a single outcome, so that we let
Γd,s,h = Γstickd,s,h, for any d ∈ VS and h ∈ {0, 1}n. By Prop. 20, for any valuation χ such that
Agt ⊆ dom(χ), it holds G, q |=χ Γd,s,0, hence also G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,0. Hence there
must exist a maximal value b ∈ {0, 1}n such that G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,b. We write bq,d,s
for one such value (notice that it need not be unique). By maximality, for any h such that
bq,d,s ≺s h, we have G, q 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,h.
Induction step.
We assume that for any d ∈ VS, any h ∈ {0, 1}n and any s ∈ {0, 1}n with |s| ≤ k, we have
defined an operator Γd,s,h, and that for any q ∈ Q, we have fixed an element bq,d,s ∈ {0, 1}n
for which G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,b and such that for any h such that bq,d,s ≺s h, it holds
G, q 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,h.
Pick s ∈ {0, 1}n with |s| = k + 1, and an extended partition τ = (sκ, qκ, dκ)1≤κ≤λ. Then
we must have |sκ| < k + 1 for all 1 ≤ κ ≤ λ, so that Γdκ,sκ,h and bqκ,dκ,sκ have been defined
at previous steps. We let
cs,τ =
j
1≤κ≤λ
(sκ uprise bqκ,dκ,sκ).
We then define
Γd,s,h = Γstickd,s,h ∨ Γsepd,s,Υs,h with Υs,h = {τ ∈ Part(s) | h s cs,τ}.
As previously, we claim that G, q |=χ Γd,s,0 for any χ such that Agt ⊆ dom(χ). Indeed,
for a given χ, if all the outcomes of the goals enabled by s follow the same infinite path, then
this path is accepted by Ds,0 and G, q |=χ Γstickd,s,0; otherwise, after some common history ρ,
the outcomes are partitioned following some extended partition τ0, which obviously satisfies
0 s cs,τ0 since 0 is a minimal element of s. Hence in that case G, q |=χ Γsepd,s,Υs,0 .
In particular, it follows that G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,0, and we can fix a maximal
element bq,d,s for which G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,bq,d,s and G, q 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,h for
any h s bq,d,s.
This concludes the inductive definition of Γd,s,bq,d,s . We now prove that it satisfies the
following lemma:
I Lemma 22. For any q ∈ Q, any d ∈ VS and any s ∈ {0, 1}n,
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there exists a timeline map ϑq,d,s for (Qixi)1≤i≤l witnessing the fact that
G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,bq,d,s
for any h s bq,d,s, there exists a timeline map ϑq,d,s,h for (Qixi)1≤i≤l witnessing the
fact that
G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ¬Γd,s,h.
Proof. The first result is a direct consequence of the construction. To prove the second part,
we again turn the satisfaction of Γd,s,h, for h s bq,d,s, into a parity game, as for the proof of
Prop. 2. We only sketch the proof here, as it involves the same ingredients.
The parity game is obtained from G by replacing each state by a quantification game.
We also introduce two sink states, qeven and qodd, which respectively are winning for Player P∃
and for Player P∀. When arriving at a leaf (q, d,m) of the (q, d)-copy of the quantification
game, there may be one of the following three transitions available:
if there is a state q′ such that for all j with s(j) = 1, it holds q′ = ∆(q,mβj ) (in other
terms, the moves selected in the current quantification game generate the same transition
for all the goals enabled by s), then there is a single transition to (q′, d′, ε), where
d′ = succ(d, q′).
otherwise, if there is an extended partition τ = (sκ, qκ, dκ)1≤κ≤λ of s such that cs,τ s h
and, for all 1 ≤ κ ≤ λ, for all j such that sκ(j) = 1, we have ∆(q,mβj ) = qκ and
succ(d, qκ) = dκ, then there is a transition from (q, d,m) to qeven.
otherwise, there is a transition from (q, d,m) to qodd.
The priorities defining the parity condition are inherited from those in Ds,h.
Since G, q 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,h, Player P∃ does not have a winning strategy in this game,
and by determinacy Player P∀ has one. From the winning strategy of Player P∀, we obtain a
timeline map ϑq,d,s,h for (Qixi)1≤i≤l witnessing the fact that G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ¬Γd,s,h.
J
I Remark. While the definition of Γd,s,bq,d,s (and in particular of bq,d,s) is not effective, the
parity games defined in the proof above can be used to compute each bq,d,s and Γd,s,bq,d,s .
Indeed, such parity games can be used to decide whether G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. Γd,s,h for
all h, and selecting a maximal value for which the result holds. Then bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn implies
G, q0 |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤lFn(βjϕj)1≤j≤n.
Each parity game has size doubly-exponential, with exponentially-many priorities; hence
they can be solved in 2 -EXPTIME. The number of games to solve is also doubly-exponential,
so that the whole algorithm runs in 2 -EXPTIME.
We now focus on the operator obtained at the end of the induction, when s = 1. Following
Prop. 20, L(D1,f ) does not depend on the exact value of f , as soon as it is in Fn. We then
let
ΓFn = Γstickd0,1,f ∨ Γsepd0,1,ΥFn
where f is any element of Fn (remember Fn is assumed to be non-empty), d0 is the vector
of initial states of the automata in D, and ΥFn = {Part(1) | c1,τ ∈ Fn}. We write ϑ1 and
ϑ1 for the maps ϑq0,d0,1 and ϑq0,d0,1,h for some h ∈ Fn, as given by Lemma 22. From the
discussion above, ϑq0,d0,1,h does not depend on the choice of h in Fn, and we simply write it
ϑq0,d0,1.
Then:
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I Lemma 23. If G, q0 |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ΓFn , then ϑ1 witnesses that G, q0 |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ΓFn .
Conversely, if G, q0 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ΓFn , then ϑ1 witness that G, q0 |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ¬ΓFn .
Proof. The first part directly follows from the previous lemma. For the second part,
G, q0 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ΓFn means that bq0,d0,1 /∈ Fn. Hence for any f ∈ Fn, we have
f s bq0,d0,1, so that ϑq0,d01 is a witness that G, q |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ¬ΓFn . J
C.4.4 Compiling optimal maps
From Lemma 22, we have timeline maps for each q, d and s. We now compile them into two
map θ and θ. The construction is inductive, along histories.
Pick a history ρ starting from q0 and strategies for universally-quantified variables
w : V∀ → (Hist→ Act). Assuming θ has been defined along all strict prefixes of ρ, a goal βjϕj
is said active after ρ w.r.t. θ(w) if the following condition holds:
∀i < |ρ|. ρ(i+ 1) = ∆(ρ(i), (θ(w)(βj(A))(ρ≤i))A∈Agt).
In other terms, βjϕj is active after ρ w.r.t. θ(w) if ρ is the outcome of strategies prescribed
by θ(w) under assignment βj . We let sρ,θ(w) be the element of {0, 1}n such that sρ,θ(w)(j) = 1
if, and only if, βjϕj is active after ρ w.r.t. θ(w).
We now define θ(w)(xi)(ρ) for all xi ∈ V:
if xi ∈ V∀, we let θ(w)(xi)(ρ) = w(xi)(ρ);
if xi ∈ V∃, we consider two cases:
if sρ,θ(w) = 1, then all goals are still active, and θ follows the map ϑ1: θ(w)(xi)(ρ) =
ϑ1(w)(xi)(ρ).
otherwise, we let ρ1 be the maximal prefix of ρ for which sρ1,θ(w) 6= sρ,θ(w). We may
then write ρ = ρ1 · ρ2, and let q1 = last(ρ1) and d1 = succ(d0, ρ1). We then let
θ(w)(xi)(ρ) = ϑq1,d1,sρ,θ(w)(w−→ρ1)(xi)(ρ2).
The dual map θ is defined in the same way, using maps ϑ in place of ϑ.
The following result will conclude our proof of Theorem 8.
I Lemma 24. There exists a valuation χ of domain V such that θ(χ|V∀) = χ and θ(χ|V∃) = χ.
It satisfies
G, q0 |=χ ΓFn ⇒ ∀w ∈ (HistG → Act)V∀ . G, q0 |=θ(w) Fn(βjϕj)1≤j≤n
G, q0 |=χ ¬ΓFn ⇒ ∀w ∈ (HistG → Act)V∃ . G, q0 |=θ(w) Fn(βjϕj)1≤j≤n
Proof. We use the same technique as in the proof of Prop. 6 (see Appendix B.1): from θ
and θ, we build a strategy valuation χ on V such that θ(χ|V∀) = χ and θ(χ|V∃) = χ.
We introduce some more notations. For w : V∀ → (HistG → Act), we let
piwj be the outcome out(q0, (θ(w)((βj(A))A∈Agt)) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n;
fw be the element of {0, 1}n such that fw(j) = 1 if, and only if, piwj |= ϕj ;
Rw ⊆ {0, 1}n ×HistG be the relation such that (s, ρ) ∈ Rw if, and only if, s = sρ,θ(w) and
ρ is minimal (meaning for any strict prefix ρ′ of ρ, it holds (s, ρ′) /∈ Rw).
I Lemma 25. For any w : V∀ → (HistG → Act) and any ρ ∈ Hist, letting dρ = succ(d0, ρ),
it holds
∀s ∈ {0, 1}n. (s, ρ) ∈ Rw ⇒ blast(ρ),dρ,s s fw.
Proof. Fix some w ∈ (HistG → Act)V∀ . The proof proceeds by induction on |s|.
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Base case: |s| = 1. Assume (s, ρ) ∈ Rw. As |s| = 1, there is a unique goal, say βj0ϕj0 ,
active along ρ w.r.t. θ(w). By definition of θ, pij0 = ρ · η where η is the outcome of
ϑlast(ρ),dρ,s(w−→ρ )((βj(A))A∈Agt) from last(ρ).
Because |s| = 1, we have Γdρ,s,blast(ρ),dρ,s = Γstickdρ,s,blast(ρ),dρ,s . The map ϑlast(ρ),dρ,s is a witness
that G, last(ρ) |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤lΓdρ,s,blast(ρ),dρ,s ; therefore it also witnesses that G, last(ρ) |=T
(Qixi)1≤i≤lΓstickdρ,s,blast(ρ),dρ,s . By definition of the Γ
stick operators, this implies that for any w,
the outcome of ϑlast(ρ),dρ,s(w−→ρ ) from last(ρ) is accepted by the automaton D
dρ
s,blast(ρ),dρ,s
;
in particular, η is accepted by Ddρs,blast(ρ),dρ,s .
The automaton Ddρs,blast(ρ),dρ,s accepts paths which give better results (w.r.t. s) for the
objectives (βjϕj)j|s(j)=1 than blast(ρ),dρ,s. In other terms, we have blast(ρ),dρ,s s fw.
Induction step. We assume that the Proposition 25 holds for any elements s ∈ {0, 1}n of
size |s| < α. We now consider for the induction step an element s ∈ {0, 1}n such that |s| = α
and (s, ρ) ∈ Rw.
if the enabled goals all follow the same outcome, i.e., if there exists an infinite path η
such that pij = ρ · η for all j having s(j) = 1, then with arguments similar to those of the
base case, we get blast(ρ),dρ,s s fw.
otherwise, the goals enabled by s split following an extended partition τ = (sκ, qκ, dκ)κ≤λ.
We let η be the history from the last state of ρ to the point where the goals split.
The map ϑlast(ρ),dρ,s witnesses that G, last(ρ) |=T Γd,s,blast(ρ),dρ,s ; therefore η may only
reach a partition τ such that
blast(ρ),dρ,s s cs,τ (9)
This partition τ is such that for any 1 ≤ κ ≤ λ, it holds (sκ, ρ · η · qκ) ∈ Rw; using the
induction hypothesis, we get
sκ uprise bqκ,dκ,sκ sκ fw (10)
Then, using Lemma 18 (see Appendix C.3) repeatedly on the (sκ)1≤κ≤λ, and Equa-
tion (10), we obtain
s1 uprise bq1,d1,s1 s1 fw ⇒ (s1 uprise bq1,d1,s1)g (s2 uprise bq2,d2,s2) s1gs2 fw
⇒ . . .
⇒ (s1 uprise bq1,d1,s1)g . . .g (sλ uprise bqλ,dλ,sλ) s1g...gsλ fw
⇒ cs,τ s fw.
Combined with (9), we get blast(ρ),dρ,s s cs,τ s fw. J
I Lemma 26. G, q0 |=χ ΓFn if, and only if, bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn.
Proof. Assume that bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn. Then G, q0 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ΓFn . Applying Lemma 23,
the map ϑ1 (and therefore θ, which act as ϑ1 before goals branch along different paths)
witnesses G, q0 6|=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ΓFn . This implies that G, q0 6|=χ ΓFn , which contradicts the
hypothesis.
Conversely, if bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn, then G, q0 |=T (Qixi)1≤i≤l. ΓFn , which is witnessed by
map ϑ1. Thus G, q0 |=χ ΓFn . J
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qt1p1 qt2p2 qu1p1 qu2p2
Figure 11 The two-agents turn-based game G
We are now ready to prove the first part of Lemma 24: consider a function w : V∀ →
(HistG → Act). By Lemma 25 applied to w, s = 1, and ρ = q0, we get that bq0,d0,1 1 fw.
Now, by Lemma 26, bq0,d0,1 ∈ Fn, therefore the element fw, being greater than bq0,d0,1
for 1, must also be in Fn, which means that G, q0 |=θ(w) Fn(βjϕj)1≤j≤n.
The second implication of the lemma is proven using similar arguments. J
Lemma 24 allows us to conclude that at least one of ϕ and ¬ϕ must hold on G for |=T .
Lemma 6 implies that at most one can hold. Combining both we get that exactly one holds.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 12
I Proposition 12. For any non-semi-stable boolean set Fn ⊆ {0, 1}n, there exists a SL[BG][
formula ϕ built on Fn, a game G and a state q0 such that G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ and G, q0 6|=T ϕ.
Proof. We consider the game G depicted on Figure 11 with two agents and . Let Fn
be a non-semi-stable set over {0, 1}n. Then there must exist f1, f2 ∈ Fn, and s ∈ {0, 1}n,
such that (f1 uprise s)g (f2 uprise s) /∈ Fn and (f2 uprise s)g (f1 uprise s) /∈ Fn. We then let
ϕ = ∀yt . ∀yu . ∀xt . ∃xu . Fn(β1ϕ1, . . . , βnϕn)
where
βi =
{
assign( 7→ yt ; 7→ xt ) if s(i) = 1
assign( 7→ yu ; 7→ xu ) if s(i) = 0
and
ϕi =

F p1 ∨ F p2 if f1(i) = f2(i) = 1
F p1 if f1(i) = 1 and f2(i) = 0
F p2 if f1(i) = 0 and f2(i) = 1
false if f1(i) = f2(i) = 0
It is not hard to check that the following holds:
I Lemma 27. Let ρ be a maximal run of G from q0. Let k ∈ {1, 2} be such that ρ visits a
state labelled with pk. Then for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have ρ |= ϕi if, and only if, fk(i) = 1.
The following two lemmas conclude the proof:
I Lemma 28. G, q0 6|=T ϕ
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Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that G, q0 |=T ϕ. We let σt (resp. σu) be the strategy
that maps history q0 to qt (resp. qu). We fix strategy τt such that τt(q0 · qt) = qt1. There is
a strategy τu (with local and timeline dependences) such that
G, q0 |=χ Fn(β1ϕ1, . . . , βnϕn)
where χ maps yt to σt, y to σu, xt to τt and xu to τu.
Since xu is only jointly applied with yu , the only important information about τu
is its value on history q0σu(q0) = q0qu. This value is then independent on the value of
τt(q0qt) = τt(q0σt(q0)). In particular, writing χ′ for the context obtained from χ by replacing
χ(yt ) = τt with τ ′t , where τ ′t(q0qt) = qt2, we also have
G, q0 |=χ′ Fn(β1ϕ1, . . . , βnϕn)
Let v and v′ be the vectors in {0, 1}n representing the values of the goals (β1ϕ1, . . . , βnϕn)
under χ and χ′. Then v and v′ are in Fn. However:
If τu(q0qu) = qu1, then v′ = (f1 uprise s)g (f2 uprise s).
If τt(q0qt) = qt2, then v = (f1 uprise s)g (f2 uprise s).
In both cases, by hypothesis, this does not belong to Fn, which is a contradiction. J
I Lemma 29. G, q0 6|=T ¬ϕ
Proof. Similarly, assume G, q0 |=T ¬ϕ. Fix any three strategies σt, σu and τt respectively
intended for the existentially quantified variables yt , yu and xt . Due to the nature of
|=T , these three strategies are independent from the strategy τu of xu . Consider then the
following strategy τu:
τu(q0.σu(q0)) = τt(q0.σt(q0))
Let χ be the resulting context and v the vector representing the values of the goals
(β1ϕ1, . . . , βnϕn) under χ. Either v = f1 or v = f2; in both case v ∈ Fn, which is a
contradiction. J
